Existing evidence shows that decision-makers' social ties to internal co-workers can lead to reduced firm performance. In this paper, we show that decision-makers' social ties to external transaction partners can also hurt firm performance. Specifically, we use 34 years of data from the National Basketball Association and study the relationship between a team's winning percentage and its use of players that the manager acquired through social ties to former employers in the industry. We find that teams with "tie-hired-players" underperform teams without tie-hired-players by 5 percent. This effect is large enough to change the composition of teams that qualify for the playoffs. Importantly, we show that adverse selection of managers and teams into the use of tie-hiring procedures cannot fully explain this finding. Additional evidence suggests instead that managers deliberately trade-off private, tie-related benefits against team performance.
Introduction
A person's social relations are a key influence factor for her attitudes, preferences, and (economic) decision-making. When searching for a job, for example, individuals have been found to frequently rely on information and resources from their social contacts (Montgomery, 1991; Bewley, 1999; Ioannides and Loury, 2004; Jackson, 2006) . In the workplace, newly formed social ties to others within the firm have been found to affect employee productivity and overall firm performance (Bandiera et al., 2005; 2008; 2009; . This paper documents field evidence on whether and how employees' history of social relations and experiences outside the firm influences firm-level decision-making and overall firm performance. We focus on a prominent form of historical, external social relationships: pre-existing, strong social ties to colleagues at a former employer in the same industry. Such ties are potentially very influential for firm-level decisions, as they create opportunities for on-going business transactions (e.g., resource acquisitions). However, the question whether tie-influenced transactions pose a blessing or a curse for the firm remains unresolved. On the one hand, external ties to others in the industry may help firm performance, as they provide superior access to relevant market information. On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that external social ties can harm firm performance if they interfere with employees' optimal selection of transaction partners. Beaman and Magruder (2012) argue that social networks create network-based incentives, which lead to a form of social transfer between network contacts. This explains why individuals prefer to recommend their less able family members (instead of more able weak ties) as workers to firms. Similarly, Lawler and Yoon (1998) argue that interactions through social ties lead to greater positive emotions than interactions with strangers. Such private benefits for decision makers may distort their decision-making on behalf of the firm, and may lead to an excessive reduction in the universe of potential transaction partners, which causes a suboptimal match of resources and firms. Note that this idea is essentially an agency argument.
! !
! 4 regression analyses reveal that this difference in winning percentages stems from teams' use of tie-hired-players on the court and not from (unobserved) quality differences of teams and managers: controlling for manager and team fixed-effects, a team's budget, and other observable characteristics, the average tie-hired-player reduces team performance by about 5 percent.
In an extended analysis, we address the underlying mechanism for this finding and show that tie-hired-players reduce team performance only if they have been acquired in the presence of low monitoring incentives for team owners. Our estimation approach builds on different streams of psychological research (e.g., Schoorman, 1988; Shepherd et al., 2009) suggesting that monitoring incentives should be lower for an owner who personally hired a manager than for an owner who "inherited" a manager from the previous owner. Information on manager turnover in the NBA supports the idea that new owners engage in stronger monitoring: within one year of an ownership change, 48 percent of pre-existing managers are replaced. Overall, the results of our study suggest that managers deliberately use their external social ties to pursue goals other than team performance maximization.
A unique feature of the institutional environment of our data allows us to address potential concerns about endogeneity bias as a source for our finding. That is, players may either be hired in the off-season period between two seasons, or after the beginning of a new season. To avoid any feedback from team performance at the beginning of the season on subsequent hiring decisions, we conduct another analysis, in which we focus only on a team's use of off-season tie-hired-players. Based on this approach, we still find a negative performance effect of tie-hired-players, and that this effect stems from tie-hired-players that the manager acquired under weak monitoring. Even when we acknowledge that off-season tie-hired-players may be influenced by a team's performance in the previous season, we find that the performance effect of tie-hired-players is negative and depends on whether they have ! ! ! 5 been acquired under weak or strong monitoring by the owner. Overall, we show that adverse selection of teams and manager into the use of tie-hiring procedures cannot fully explain our findings.
While the setting of this analysis is unusual, the results of our study have fairly broad
implications. Several studies in the management and economics literature reveal that employees' external social ties influence their decision-making on behalf of the firm, for example, in connection with hiring (Fernandez and Weinberg, 1997; Williamson and Cable, 2003) financing (Shane and Cable, 2002), or investing (Cohen et al., 2008) . 5 Anecdotal evidence also seems to suggest that firms often seek well-connected employees. Our industry-wide analysis shows the hidden costs of such hiring practices, and reveals the novel finding that network-based incentives can lead to discrimination of external transaction partners. 6 We also show that firms can counterbalance this form of discrimination, if they are willing to incur additional costs (e.g., in the form of extended monitoring). This second finding extends, and confirms the insights of a recent, small economic literature that shows how incentive contracts reduce workers' favoritism towards socially connected others (Bandiera et al., 2009; Beaman and Magruder, 2012; Beaman et al., 2013) .
We structure this paper as follows. In the next Section, we provide a brief background on player acquisitions in the NBA. In Section 3, we present our research hypothesis, and theoretical framework. In Section 4, we present our estimation approach to determine the effect of tie-hired-players on team performance. In Section 5, we present our empirical results. In Section 6, we conclude.
However, these studies do not address the performance effect of tie-influenced decisions for the firm. 6 Few empirical studies address the negative performance effects of external social ties. However, the findings of these studies differ from ours, as they only show negative performance effects when decision makers bring their social contacts inside the firm (e.g., through job recommendations (Beaman and Magruder, 2012; Beaman et al., 2013) , through mergers (Ishii and Xuan, Forthcoming) or as supervisors to reduce monitoring (Fracassi and Tate, 2012) ). As we discuss further in Section 4.2, a manager's social-ties in our study do not relate to the hired player, but to the coach or owner (or both) of the player's current team. Accordingly, the manager's social ties still remain outside the boundaries of his team after a player transaction.
Background on Player Acquisitions in the NBA
Since its merger with the American Basketball Association (ABA) in 1976, the NBA has been the only major professional basketball league in Northern America. The (combined) league initially had 22 teams in 1976/77 and has expanded since, and as of 2011, the NBA consists of 30 teams in two conferences. Each team plays 82 games over the course of a season, before the eight best teams in each conference proceed into the playoffs to determine the league champion.
To increase their performance, teams compete for the most talented players on a restricted labour market. In each team, the responsibility for player acquisitions rests exclusively with the team's (general) manager who has been hired by the team owner to act on his behalf. This principal-agent relationship reflects the owner's need to rely on the manager's expert knowledge in acquisition decisions: in contrast to team owners, most managers have a career history as player or coach in professional basketball, which provides them with specific knowledge (most of which can be assumed to be tacit knowledge from their game experiences) about "what it takes" for a team to succeed in the NBA.
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There are two important features of player acquisitions in the NBA that distinguish them from the hiring decisions of firms in other industries. First, a manager can only acquire new players from three different types of sources. These are: other teams inside the NBA, other teams outside the NBA, and the annual player draft. In the annual draft, teams are allowed to select upcoming college, high school or international players from a pool of new, young players (so-called "rookies"). Acquisitions from other NBA teams are by far the most popular choice of managers and account for 67 percent of all player-hiring decisions followed by the draft (21%) and transactions with other teams outside the NBA (12%). Thus, we can treat the
NBA as a nearly closed system of extraordinarily talented workers (who generally spend their entire careers within this industry). 
Research Hypothesis
We assume that a team owner hires a manager to maximize team performance by acquiring the best available basketball players (subject to budget constraints). The players that the manager acquires from other NBA teams come either from former employers (we refer to such players as tie-hired-players), or from other teams (non-tie-hired-players). We test the null hypothesis that teams with tie-hired-players show identical sporting performances as teams without tie-hired-players.
Hypothesis 1:
The sporting success of a team does not depend on its use of tie-hired-players instead of non-tie-hired-players.
The exact procedure behind such free-agent signings differs slightly: in 74 percent of such signings, the player received a long-term contract, in 22 percent, the player received a short-term contract (a so-called "10-daycontract"), and in 4 percent the player was acquired by means of the expansion draft (which provides newly created teams the opportunity to recruit players from a specific set of "unprotected" players from existing teams).
In contrast to this null hypothesis, social capital (e.g., Adler and Kwon, 2002) and agency theory (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989) predict that tie-hired-players can affect team performance. Although both theories suggest that managers use their social ties deliberately to economize on search costs, they disagree on the associated performance effect: social capital theory predicts a positive performance effect of tie-hired-players, whereas agency theory predicts a negative performance effect. In the following, we discuss each of these theories.
In the NBA, information is an important element in properly matching players to teams and positions. However, the search for better players and information comes at substantial costs for teams, which calls for mechanisms to reduce such costs. In this regard, a manager's social ties may prove valuable to his team for several reasons. Uzzi (1996) , for example, notes that decision makers can reduce the high level of uncertainty in hiring decisions through fine-grained information transfer in social tie relationships. Similarly, Jackson (2010) argues that social networks allow for the mitigation of substantial search frictions, as they enable the communication of critical information to firms regarding the potential fit of workers. The use of social ties further reduces search costs, as decision makers are able to use trusted social contacts that are already in place and need not invest in constructing new ones (Granovetter, 2005) . A manager who wishes to acquire the best available players in the market can thus use his strong social ties to former employers as an instrument to achieve this goal with substantially lower search costs for his team. Specifically, he can select an acquisition source through his social ties, as the relational characteristics of social ties allow for a more reliable information exchange based on trust and closeness (Moran, 2005) .
9 A manager's external ties to other teams constitute "bridging ties" (in the sense of McEvily and Zaheer, 1999) , because they connect his team "to sources of information and opportunities that are not available from other network contacts" (p. 1136). Intuitively, this view implies that social ties to players' current employers provide more precise information about their playing quality, than any other form of intra-industry social ties. In contrast to Granovetter (1973) , McEvily and Zaheer (1999) argue that such bridging ties are not always weak
It is important to see that this reasoning can make the use of social ties beneficial during conceptually different acquisition procedures such as player trades and free-agent signings.
That is, both acquisition procedures provide opportunities for interactions and information exchange through social ties. In trades, the direct transaction partner is the player's current team. In free-agent signings, the player's current team does not form the direct transaction partner (because the team no longer holds property rights over him) but can be contacted for up-to-date information about the free-agent, and his availability.
However, agency theory may also have some explanatory power in the context of tieinfluenced player acquisitions in the NBA. That is, the owner-manager relationship exhibits all of the factors necessary to cause substantial agency costs. First, the owner and manager are linked by a principal-agent relationship in which the manager has been hired to act on the behalf of the owner. Second, the manager has substantially greater expert knowledge in professional basketball than the owner, which gives the manager an informational advantage.
Third, the owner is unable to judge the quality of a manager's search effort, as a player's fit into a team cannot be directly inferred from his performance statistics with other teams.
Instead, the manager must expend substantial search effort to improve the fit. As the marginal benefit of this search effort is unobservable, the manager has the opportunity to use social ties to pursue his self-interest instead of the team owner's interest. That is, the manager can pretend to use his social ties for superior resource acquisitions, because social tie relations are to a large extent shaped by tacit behaviour (Uzzi, 1996) , which makes it difficult for a team owner to judge the value of a manager's interaction through his social ties.
Two examples for managers' self-interest maximization to the disadvantage of teams are choices characterized by inefficiently low effort levels and the selection of inefficient transaction partners that create private benefits for the manager. In the first case, the use of
ties. Indeed, the degree of knowledge sharing between organizational units has been shown to increase with tiestrength (Tortoriello et al., 2012) .
social ties helps to reduce disutility from search efforts, as social relations form a salient selection criterion for prechoice activities. Such activities reduce personal workload, as they reduce the number of choice alternatives that need to be evaluated in the decision process.
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Similarly, Levin and Cross (2004) acknowledge that managers may simply approach socially tied others for convenience. This can cause better-suited players in the market to be neglected, as they are currently under contract with unrelated teams. In the second case, managers often derive additional, private utility from interactions with socially connected others. Specifically, such interactions can produce positive emotions such as feelings of pleasure and enjoyment (Lawler and Yoon, 1998; Bandiera et al., 2010) and can lead to a form of "consumption on the job" for managers. Therefore, such network-based incentives can distort the manager's cost-benefit evaluation of a transaction partner, leading again to an inefficient focus on socially tied teams in player acquisitions. 11 Again, this effect may influence managers' decision-making for player trades, and free-agent signings, alike.
We want to stress that both types of self-interest maximization can occur although managers have strong incentives to do well with their teams. Specifically, we acknowledge that a manager's future career depends on how well he does with his current team. However, this does not imply that the manager is never willing to engage in suboptimal hiring decisions. Instead, it suggests that suboptimal hiring decisions can occur whenever the increase in expected utility for the manager (as previously described) outweighs his expected disutility from a (slight) reduction in team performance.
Estimation Approach

Data
We construct a new dataset with all 908 team-year observations in the period from 1977/78 until 2010/11. For each season, our dataset includes information on each team's regularseason winning percentage and roster characteristics (such as payroll, total number of players on the roster, total game appearances of players, and new players on the roster). We combine this data with the complete transaction history between all teams. We obtained this information from Sports Reference LLC, a professional company that specializes in the collection and publication of sports data.
Identification of manager social ties and tie-hired-players
We focus on a prominent type of managers' social relationships to identify their set of external social ties: the social ties to colleagues at a former employer (i.e., another NBA team). 12 Such ties are potentially very influential for managers' decision-making, as managers frequently acquire players from other teams inside the NBA. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that managers who have started a new employment relationship continue to interact with their former employers on the market for player talent. Our data support this idea:
managers are 32 percent more likely to acquire players from socially tied teams than from unrelated teams.
We identify a manager's active social tie to another team from two requirements. First, he must previously have worked for that team (as a manager). Second, the current owner or McEvily et al. (2012) use co-working histories of lawyers to study the effect of employees' external social ties on firm growth. However, our focus on personal ties to other teams implies that we only include between-team player acquisitions in our analysis. While this procedure may seem restrictive at first glance, there is good reason to exclude drafted players. Camerer and Weber (1999) , for example, show that top drafted players in the NBA play excessive minutes (relative to their performance). That is, teams often "overuse" their top draft picks, which can lead to negative performance effects. Similarly, teams may expose substantial biases that lead to financial overvaluation of top picks (see Massey and Thaler, 2013) To classify players into the groups of tie-hired-players and non-tie-hired-players, we use the complete record of all player acquisition decisions in our sample period. We identify a player as a tie-hired-player if a manager's social tie was involved in the player's acquisition and if it is the player's first season with the new team. We focus on a player's first year for
Our results are robust to the use of two extended social tie measures. The first measure also includes a manager's history as a coach with former teams. The second measure allows for the possibility that a manager maintains ties to all his previous employers, irrespective of whether his colleagues on the coach, manager or owner level are still with those teams (meaning that we drop the second requirement of our original identification approach). The results are available from the authors upon request (for reviewers: see supplementary section at the end). The decisive criterion for a player to be classified as tie-hired-player is not that the manager gained first-hand information about this player during previous employment spells, but that the manager acquired the player from a team to which he had an active social tie at the time of the acquisition. (1977/78-1984/85, and 1989/90 ) during our sample period, which leads to a substantially lower number of observations (N=700).
In Panel B, we show statistics on the individual manager level. Of particular interest is a manager's potential for tie-hiring decisions. We construct this number as follows: in each
season, a manager has as many opportunities for tie-hiring decisions, as he has active ties to other teams. By summing up these seasonal opportunities over his career years, we obtain his total potential for tie-hiring decisions. On average, this potential is 1.39 leading to 0.50 tiehiring decisions over the career. While these numbers are quite low, they reflect on the small number of managers who ever worked for more than one team. Therefore, Panel C provides the same statistics for the subsample of managers who ever had any ties. For each of these managers, the statistics reflect only years with active social ties. We can see that these managers account for 22 percent of all managers in our sample, had a potential for tie-hiring decisions of 6.36, and made on average two tie-hiring decisions throughout those years, which amounts to 6.7 percent of all their hiring decisions. Note that there exists substantial heterogeneity among managers, as this share is as high as 50 percent for some of them.
-Insert Table 1 here -
Methodology
To analyse the effect of tie-hired-players on team performance, we regress a team's sporting performance on the number of game appearances by tie-hired-players, payroll, number of players used (to account for bad injury luck), and a team's number of games played by all players. We always use the exact number of game appearances such that, for example, the use of two tie-hired-players in one game leads to two more game appearances by tie-hiredplayers. Importantly, we also include team and manager fixed-effects to account for the performance effect of unobserved team and manager quality, respectively. 16 By controlling
16 From time to time, teams relocate and re-appear in the league under a new name. However, the league treats these teams as a continuous legal entity, independent of the team name and host city. Similar to Barden and Mitchell (2007) 
17 An alternative empirical approach would have been to adopt an event study design, in which team performance in matches before the hiring decision is compared to team performance in matches after the hiring decision. We decided not to adopt such an empirical design, because many hirings occur in the "off-season" period. That is, in many cases, there exists a substantial time gap between matches before and after the hiring decision, which makes this identification approach less appealing to us.
substitution of a tie-hired-player for a non-tie-hired-player on the team, as increasing the number of games played by tie-hired-players corresponds to a reduction in the number of games played by non-tie-hired-players. While social capital theory predicts that ! ! will be positive, agency theory predicts it will be negative.
Empirical Results
Model-Free Evidence
Before we turn to the estimation results of equation (1), we report the results of a modelfree analysis of our data. Specifically, we compare winning percentages across the groups of teams that use tie-hired-players on the court and teams that do not. 18 We find that teams with tie-hired-players win 45.2 percent of their regular season games, while teams in the other group win 50.2 percent of their games (t = 2.31, p<0.05). This implies that teams with tiehired-players underperform their competitors without tie-hired-players by 11 percent. This finding therefore provides initial, suggestive evidence against the null hypothesis that a team's use of tie-hired-players does not impact its sporting success. Table 2 shows regression estimates for the performance effect of using tie-hired-players on the team instead of other players. In Model (M1), we only introduce team fixed-effects in the analysis, while Models (M2) and (M3) incorporate our other controls and manager fixedeffects, respectively. In contrast to the null hypothesis, all models reveal that tie-hired-players reduce team performance. We emphasize that the negative performance effect of tie-hiredplayers cannot simply reflect adverse selection of managers into the use of social ties as an (thereby missing the playoffs). This finding implies that the impact of social ties on the hiring behaviour of managers can be crucial for making the playoffs.
Regression Analysis
-Insert Table 2 here -
Extended Analysis: Monitoring Incentives and the Performance Effect
We now aim to test more directly whether the use of social ties in hiring decisions represents deliberate opportunistic behaviour by managers. 20 Our test is based on the idea that if managers maximize utility taking into account private benefits that stem from interactions with former employers, we expect that this type of opportunistic behaviour should be more
Other explanations for the negative performance effect may come to mind. For example, tie-hired-players might be "diamonds-in-the-rough" which underperform in the short-run, but outperform in the longer-run. If this was true, our focus on a player's sporting performance in the first season with a new team might give a downward biased view on the quality of the acquisition decision. Alternatively, managers could use their social ties to realize non-sporting benefits for the team, such as reduced player acquisition costs, or ease of negotiation. If this was true, our focus on sporting performance might give a downward biased view on the benefits of tiehired-players. However, based on a series of alternative estimation equations (available upon request), we do not find evidence for any of these explanations (for reviewers: see supplementary section). 20 Alternatively, it could be that managers wish to benefit the team with tie-hired-players but mistakenly make poor decisions for the team. For example, previous work has highlighted that the external social ties of decision makers can harm firm performance due to poor decision making in response to a heightened sense of trust between socially tied actors, familiarity bias, or social conformity and groupthink (e.g., Ishii and Xuan, Forthcoming). Similarly, social capital theorists have long acknowledged that decision makers can become overly embedded in social networks, which reduces opportunities for collaboration (Granovetter, 1985) , because network contacts feel obliged to assist each other (rather than members outside the social network).! ! ! ! 18 pronounced when monitoring by the team owner is weak. As a consequence, tie-hired-players should be most detrimental to team performance if they were acquired under weak monitoring.
To test this prediction, we assume that a manager faces weaker monitoring if he has personally been hired by his owner than if he has been hired by a previous team owner. For example, the literature on emotional costs of failure asserts, "greater negative emotions are generated when one's own decision "causes" the onset of the negative outcome rather than when others make that decision" (Shepherd et al., 2009 ). This observation implies that an owner who personally hired a (bad) manager faces greater negative emotional costs from replacing this manager. In anticipation of these costs, the owner might deliberately reduce the "detection probability" of a bad manager by reducing his monitoring activity. In a similar vein, the literature on the escalation of commitment has shown that supervisors change their employee performance evaluation upwards when they were directly included in the hiring decision and agreed with the selection of the candidate (Schoorman, 1988) . Our data provide support for this idea: as new owners collect more and more information over time, the share of pre-installed managers that have been replaced increases from 48 percent in the first year to 58, and 63 percent after two and three years, respectively.
Therefore, we re-estimate equation (1) but distinguish between tie-hired-players that were acquired by managers under weak monitoring, and tie-hired-players that were acquired by managers under strong monitoring. Note that the difference between weak and strong monitoring stems from the order of individuals' arrivals at the team: under weak monitoring, the manager arrived after the current owner, while under strong monitoring, the manager arrived before the current owner. Table 3 displays the associated estimation results. In line with our prediction, we find a statistically significant, negative performance effect of tiehired-players that were acquired under weak monitoring. In contrast, we do not find a ! ! ! 19 statistically significant effect from tie-hired-players that were acquired under strong
monitoring. An F-test supports the impression that the coefficients for tie-hired-players across the two monitoring regimes are significantly different (F=4.58, p<0.05).
-Insert Table 3 hereOverall, these additional findings make it unlikely that behavioural biases or overembeddedness of managers are the predominant mechanism behind the negative performance effect. Instead, we take our findings as evidence that managers are well aware of the trade-off between personal benefits from the use of social ties and the negative performance effect on the team. In line with the prediction of agency theory, this leads them to trade-off private benefits against negative performance less aggressively if properly monitored by the owner.
Exploiting Institutional Features: Addressing Endogeneity
As with all non-experimental studies there exist reasons to be concerned about endogeneity bias as a source for our findings. For example, McDonald and Westphal (2003) , show that decision makers have a greater tendency to rely on their social ties when firm performance is already low. This poses a potential adverse selection problem for our analysis, because teams frequently acquire players after the beginning of a new season. Specifically, it could be that the negative performance effect of tie-hired-players reflects exclusively on the poor performance that teams already showed before they acquired these players. In this subsection we use two different specifications to address this potential concern.
In the first specification, we exploit an institutional feature of the NBA, namely that seasons in the NBA are divided into a foregoing off-season period between June and October ! ! ! 20
(when team preparation occurs) and a playing period beginning in November. Teams usually acquire their players during the off-season but are allowed to make roster adjustments during the playing period. In the following, we focus only on off-season tie-hired-players and exclude all tie-hired-players who were acquired after the beginning of the playing season.
This chronological separation of hiring decisions and the performance generating mechanism (the games) implies that off-season tie-hired-players cannot reflect low performance early in the season. Technically speaking, the timely separation implies that the number of off-season tie-hired-players is predetermined in the team performance regression. Table 4 , Model (E1) displays estimation results when we re-estimate equation (1) by only considering games played by off-season tie-hired-players. While the reduction in the number of tie-hired-players leads to a reduction in statistical significance, we still find a negative performance effect that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Importantly, Model (E2) shows that this negative performance effect stems exclusively from tie-hired-players that were acquired under weak monitoring. Again, an F-test shows that the coefficients for tie-hired-players across the two monitoring regimes are significantly different (F=6.99, p<0.05).
In the second specification, we acknowledge that off-season tie-hired-players may partly reflect on the team's sporting performance in the previous season (Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007) . This poses a problem for our estimation whenever a team's sporting performance is considerably lower than its long-term average (which is reflected in the team fixed-effects).
Therefore, we also estimate two models, in which we control for a team's lagged winning percentage from the previous season (s-1). coefficient on tie-hired-players under weak monitoring is still statistically significant at the 5 percent level, but reduces in size (in absolute terms). In contrast, the positive coefficient on tie-hired-players under strong monitoring increases relative to Model (E2) and even becomes statistically significant. Accordingly, an F-test strongly rejects the coefficient equality for tiehired-players across monitoring regimes (F=14.18, p<0.01). Taken together, these findings imply that the pooled measure in (E3) must lose statistical significance relative to our findings in Model (E1). We emphasize that while the positive, statistically significant effect from tie-hired-players under strong monitoring seems to support the prediction from social capital theory that the use of social ties can benefit the firm, this finding depends critically on the monitoring incentives for the owner. In addition, some caution seems to be in order as the coefficient is only marginally significant (p=0.099).
Overall, the evidence from these two additional specifications that pose much less scope for endogeneity bias confirms that the reason behind the negative performance effect of tiehired-players lies in the lack of sufficiently strong monitoring from team owners.
-Insert Table 4 here -
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide industry-wide evidence on the overall performance effect of employees' use of external strong social ties to others outside the firm. We focus on external social ties to a prominent group of firm outsiders: colleagues at a former employer in the same industry. The fact that such ties are usually strong ties, which persist beyond shared coworking experiences makes them potentially very influential for firm-level decisions. An important question for firms is therefore whether ties to former employers should be expected
to interfere with the selection of transaction partners in decision-making on behalf of the firm.
We add to the existing knowledge by providing an analysis of a unique, naturally occurring panel field dataset that provides a rare opportunity to determine the relevance of employees' external social ties for firm-level decision-making in the field. Based on the complete transaction history between all teams in the National Basketball Association in it current form (34 years), we show that a manager's external, social ties to his past (employers)
can harm team performance in the present. The effect is large: controlling for a team's budget and other characteristics, the average tie-hired-player reduces team performance by about 5 percent. We also find that the negative performance effect is entirely driven by managers under team owners with low monitoring incentives. These findings lend support to the idea that -in the absence of appropriate performance incentives -network-based incentives can sometimes undermine firm-level objectives. Notes: The dependent variable is a team's (logarithmic) regular season winning percentage. All independent variables are measured relative to their league averages in a season. Robust standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering at the team level are given in parentheses. All estimations also included a constant (not reported). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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S1. Alternative Explanations for the Negative Performance Effect
While our main finding is perfectly in line with the predictions of agency theory, other explanations may come to mind. For example, tie-hired-players might be "diamonds-in-therough" which underperform in the short-run, but outperform in the longer-run. Another possibility could be that managers use their social ties to realize non-sporting benefits for the team. If this was true, our focus on sporting performance might give a downward biased view on the benefits of tie-hired-players.
According to the "diamonds-in-the-rough" explanation, managers might use their social ties to acquire players that have great upside potential, but need some time to develop. Such hiring decisions are beneficial to the team, if their negative performance effect in the first year is more than offset by positive performance effects over the following years of their contract. To address this possibility, we perform another analysis in which we re-classify a player as "tie-hired" if his current team acquired him via a social tie, and if he is still under his initial contract with that team. Note that this measure includes all tie-hired-players as in our main specification but also includes tie-hired-players that have already been with the team for more than one season. As Table S .1, Panel A shows, the associated coefficient on the game appearances of such "long-run tie-hired-players" remains negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Overall, this finding contradicts the notion that the use of social ties in player acquisitions leads to superior team performance in the longer-run.
Alternatively, it could be that managers use their social ties in acquisition decisions as a means to create non-sporting benefits for the team. To address this possibility, we consider two such non-sporting benefits: a player's monetary wage cost, and the expected ease of negotiation during acquisitions.
To determine the effect of manager social ties on player wage costs, we focus on players that were acquired as free-agents. The reason for this restriction is that for traded players, the
acquiring team continues to pay the same salary that the player used to receive from his previous team. Instead, the salary of a free-agent can be freely negotiated between the player and his new team. we also include a variable that indicates whether the player was acquired from a socially tied team of the manager. As our results show, we do not find any significant influence from a social tie being involved on the players' salary level.
Negotiation is usually easier between parties that trust each other. That is, trust between parties reduces transaction costs. Accordingly, transaction costs are likely to be relatively small if managers acquire players from socially tied teams, because of the social capital that resides in strong ties. To test whether this understanding motivates manager behaviour, we looked at managers' free-agent acquisitions. Our approach is motivated by the fact that these acquisitions differ from player trades insofar as the negotiation partner is the player, and not the socially tied team. Therefore, managers should have no reason to believe that negotiations are going to be easier just because a player arrives from a socially tied team. Still, using a linear probability model (LPM) to estimate the acquisition probability of free-agents across socially tied and unrelated teams, we find that managers' acquisition probability increases by 6 percentage points in the presence of a social tie. Relative to the unconditional hiring probability, this is an increase of 56 percent ( Table 2 . Robust standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering at the team level are given in parentheses. In Panel B, the dependent variable is a player's (logarithmic, inflation-adjusted) salary. The estimation included controls for player age, experience, past performance and salary, as well as fixed-effects for position, team, and season. In Panel C, the dependent variable is a manager's acquisition probability from other teams. The estimation assumes that each manager in a league with N teams has N-1 acquisition sources per season. In each season, this creates N*(N-1) observations. As we base our analysis on 34 seasons, most of which had around 26 teams in the league, this gives us 23,381 observations. The estimation included manager and season fixed-effects. Robust standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering on the manager level are given in parentheses. All estimations also included a constant (not reported). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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S2. Social Tie Measure: Extensions
In this supplementary section, we consider two extensions of our social tie measure. In the first extension, we include a manager's history as manager and coach, as it is not unusual for a manager in the NBA to have formerly worked as a coach with other teams. In the second extension, we acknowledge the possibility that a manager may maintain social ties to his former employers via connections to former colleagues on other levels than coach, manager or owner level. While we believe that a manager's ties to former colleagues at these latter levels are most valuable for player acquisition decisions, we emphasize that this extension provides additional credibility to our findings as it considerably extends the number of tiehired-players in our sample (see Table S .2). However, in constructing this second extension, we face the considerable challenge that complete information on each employee's working history in the NBA is unavailable. Therefore, we assume that a manager has a social tie to another team if he has previously worked as either a manager or coach for that team, irrespective of whether his former colleagues on the coach, manager, or owner level are still with that team. Note that this second extended measure is potentially much more noisy than the measure in our main specification, which is due to the unobservability of social ties to colleagues on other levels. manager, but also his active ties to teams where he worked as coach (i.e., where either the former owner and/or manager continue to work). In Panel B, the social tie measure includes the manager's complete employment history, with some of the ties being potentially inactive. Notes: The displayed estimation results follow our core estimation model (equation (1)). The dependent variable is a team's (logarithmic) regular season winning percentage. All independent variables are measured relative to their league averages in a season. Robust standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering at the team level are given in parentheses. All estimations also included a constant (not reported). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
